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ABSTRACT 
 
Most major process safety incidents are preventable and can be avoided as shown in 
several incident investigation reports. Moreover, these reports indicated that these 
incidents were certain to occur as shown from the related near-misses and safety control 
system failures that occurred prior to the incidents. 
 
The key element to improve process safety performance is developing effective process 
safety leading indicators. In the past, the petrochemical industrial organizations used 
traditional personnel safety measures to measure process safety performance. Now, most 
of the current industrial facilities focus more on process safety lagging indicators. 
Ignoring organizational factors and lacking a systematic approach were the major 
deficiencies during the development of process safety indicators. 
 
The main objective of this research is to construct a systematic technique to develop 
process safety leading indicators by selecting the most effective leading indicators, 
defining different safety metrics for each leading indicator, conducting accurate 
measurements, monitoring these metrics on a frequent basis, and revalidating the 
measures using lagging indicators and near-misses. The effects and contribution of 
different organizational factors were studied and analyzed within process safety 
performance. Process safety leadership, data collection system, and proactive monitoring 
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are critical factors that directly impact the development of process safety leading 
indicators.   
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NOMENCLATURE 
 
AICHE  American Institute of Chemical Engineers  
API American Petroleum Institute 
BP  British Petroleum Company 
CCPS Center for Chemical Process Safety 
CSB  Chemical Safety Board 
EHS Environmental Health and Safety 
HAZOP Hazard and Operability Study 
HSE Health and Safety Executive 
LOPC Lost of Primary Containment 
MI Mechanical Integrity  
MLE  Most Likely Explanation 
MOC Management of Change 
OSHA   Occupational Safety and Health Administration  
OECD   Organization for Economic Coordination and Development 
OGP    International Association of Oil & Gas Producers 
PHA Process Hazard Analysis 
PM Preventive Maintenance 
PSM Process Safety Management 
SPI   Safety Performance Indicator 
VCE Vapor Cloud Explosion 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
The petrochemical industries have developed significantly over the past years. This 
development resulted of using an advanced technologies and complex processes. The 
hazards and risks increased as result of these advanced technologies and complex 
processes. The safety management system was one of the efficient and effective ways to 
control the hazards and significantly reduce the incidents in the industry. The industry 
has focused a lot on the personnel or occupational safety performance to measure the 
effectiveness of their safety management system. A lot of companies were confused 
between personnel safety and process safety. The injury rates cannot represent the 
process safety performance.    
 
The phrase “process safety” has been used a lot after the BP Texas city refinery 
explosion in 2005. There are several definitions for process safety available in literature 
that mostly shared the same meaning and contents with different words and 
explanations. In general, process safety can be defined as the preventions and 
mitigations of the risks and hazards that are associated with the industrial process 
activities. Process safety incidents include release of either potentially hazardous 
(flammable or toxic) materials or release of energy in the form of fires or explosions 
(Baker, Leveson et al., 2007). Process safety programs are focusing on the process 
design and engineering, mechanical integrity, process hazard analysis, risk assessment, 
management of change and other elements related to the industrial processes.  
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1.1 Problem Statement 
Most of the major process safety incidents are preventable and can be avoided as shown 
in many incident investigation reports. Moreover, there are clear trends that these 
incidents will happen. Unfortunately, these trends are discovered after the incidents. 
Process safety leading and lagging indicators should be used to measure the process 
safety performance. There was a lot of focus on process safety lagging indicators, which 
were clear and easy to be defined and measured by the industrial facilities. These are 
after the fact measurements such as number of fires, leaks and explosions. The process 
safety indicators are still in nascent stages where a lot of industrial companies are 
struggling in measuring these indicators in a systematic and an effective way. Most of 
the current techniques that are used for developing process safety leading indicators are 
lacking of an efficient systematic approach. In addition, organizational factors have 
significant contributions to most of industrial incidents and these organizational factors 
were not included in the current techniques to develop the process safety indicators. 
 
1.2 Motivation 
Process safety leading indicators are key factors in preventing a lot of major process 
safety incidents. They are forward-looking and can identify deficiencies in the safety 
system before it grow up and cause a serious problem. Accurate measurement of these 
indicators are very important to prevent incidents and losses. Since there are a lot of 
leading indicators, it is difficult to choose which indicators shall be measured and how. 
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1.3 Research Objective  
The main objective of this research is to develop a systematic method for developing 
process safety leading indicators in the petrochemical industry. The research will use 
different approaches to develop a well-designed systematic technique to measure the 
process safety leading indicators. This systematic approach will focus on continuous 
monitoring of the safety system as a whole structure that include lagging indicators, 
near-misses and leading indicators.  
 
1.4 Research Approach 
The research will focus on the development of process safety leading indicators. The 
research will start with a literature review about the history of the process safety and the 
similarities and differences between the process safety and personnel (occupational) 
safety including illustration of the common factors between the two types that may cause 
some misunderstanding in most industrial facilities. Also, the common techniques for 
developing process safety leading indicators will be explained briefly with main 
advantages and limitations of each technique.  
 
Historical data with expert judgment will be utilized to select the critical process safety 
leading indicators elements. These data will be used to build a systematic method using 
Bayesian network to develop appropriate process safety leading indicators and metrics. 
The systematic method structure will focus on the selection and revalidation of the 
measuring metrics. The organizational factors will be analyzed during the selection and 
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development phase. The importance of near-miss analysis and its relation to accurate 
development of process safety leading indicators will be discussed in details.  
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 2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW   
In this section, the background of process safety and comparison between personnel 
safety and process safety will be clarified briefly. The literature review will include the 
major incident that bring attention to process safety indicators and the importance of 
measuring the process safety leading and lagging indicators to prevent process safety 
incidents. The current common techniques for developing process safety indicators will 
be discussed, concentrating on the advantages and limitations of each method.  
 
2.1 Process Safety and Personnel Safety 
There was a lot of confusion in the industry between personnel safety (occupational 
safety) and process safety. Personnel safety can be defined as prevention or mitigation of 
the risks and hazards that are directly related to individuals. Personnel safety mostly 
deals with the risks related to physical injuries including slips, falls, electrocutions, 
burns, and motor vehicle accidents. So, personnel safety is more related to individual 
workers (Hopkins, 2009).  
 
As per the American Petroleum Institute (API), process safety can be defined as “a 
disciplined framework for managing the integrity of hazardous operating systems and 
processes by applying good design principles, engineering, and operating and 
maintenance practice” (API, 2010). Process safety is related to prevention of incidents 
that meet four criteria as defined by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) 
which are (1) physical or chemical process involvement, (2) location within an industrial 
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facility, (3) the exceedance of minimum threshold limit, and (4) acute release. The first 
criterion is physical and chemical processes that take place within all process equipment 
including tanks, piping, heat exchangers, reactors and other processes in the industry. 
The second criterion is that the process incident happens inside the perimeter of the 
industrial facility. The third criterion can be either uncontrolled releases of flammable or 
toxic materials above the threshold limit, or releases of any materials including non-
flammable and non-toxic materials that may have the potential to cause harm to people. 
The fourth and last criterion for the process safety incidents is the acute release of the 
material that exceeds the threshold limit within a short time (CCPS, 2011).  
 
Before the BP Texas Refinery explosion in 2005, most of the industrial facilities were 
focusing on the personnel or occupational safety to measure their safety system 
performance. This measurement will not give a correct indication of the safety level in 
their facility. Most of industrial facilities were using personnel safety to measure the 
process safety which resulted in insufficiencies in their safety system. Personnel safety 
can be measured by the number of injuries and fatalities in the industrial facility using 
different standardized formulas, such as OSHA incident rate and fatal accident rate. 
These indicators cannot represent how well the industrial facility is doing in process 
safety. Several catastrophic process incidents happened in facilities that have a low rate 
of fatalities and injuries.  
    
 7 
 
Different organizations work to clarify the differences between process safety and 
personnel safety and importance of process safety after the BP Texas refinery explosion 
in 2005. The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) has issued multiple 
publications on this field.  Process safety and personnel safety are totally independent 
and one type cannot be used to measure the other type. However, there are some 
common elements that have strong effects on both types, such as system safety and 
safety culture.  Deficiencies within the safety system are the main causes for the major 
personnel and process incidents in the industry (Baker, Leveson et al., 2007). 
 
Positive safety culture has a significant effect on the personnel and process safety. It 
encourages personnel to act safely and prevent hazards. It also puts a lot of emphasis on 
organizational process safety in analyzing associated risks and hazards (Reiman & 
Pietikäinen, 2010). Measuring the effects of safety culture on process safety is a complex 
process. The effect of safety culture can be seen in proactive risk assessments, frequent 
walkthroughs by senior management, effective communication, individual safety 
attitude, and safety commitment by all employees (Biggs, Dinsdag et al., 2010).        
 
The process safety field started in the last decade after the major process safety disasters. 
However, the petrochemical industries started to put a lot of emphasis on measuring 
process safety performance after the BP Texas City Refinery explosion in 2005. The 
excellent personnel (occupational) safety performance for this facility didn’t represent 
the actual process safety performance (CSB, 2007). This was the typical attitude in most 
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industrial facilities. There was no clear measurement guide of the process safety 
performance and most of the industrial facilities were using normal incident and fatality 
rate to measure their process safety performance. The deficiency in their process safety 
was one of the major findings in the incident investigation report that was conducted by 
U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB). 
 
2.2 Importance of Process Safety Indicators 
Process safety indicators are the key elements to improve process safety performance in 
the petrochemical industry through measuring and monitoring process safety 
performance activities against requirements and objectives. The process safety indicators 
should identify all factors and causes that can lead to high potential process safety 
incidents. The process safety indicators should work also to eliminate these factors and 
causes to prevent process safety incidents. The process safety indicators can be classified 
into two main categorizations, which are leading indicators and lagging indicators.  
 
The lagging indicators are used to measure the process safety events that already 
occurred including explosions, fires, and flammable or toxic material releases. The 
lagging indicators are considered the accurate outcome measurement of the process 
safety system. Lagging indicators are the most common process safety indicators that are 
used in the industry because they are clear and easy to be identified and measured 
(Wang, 2012). The lagging indicators can be analyzed and assessed to identify the 
potential risks and deficiencies in the process safety system. Then, the identified 
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potential risks and deficiencies shall be rectified before a major incident occurs. One of 
the major advantages of the lagging indicators is that they can be normalized to have a 
better comparison between different industrial organizations. The normalization factors, 
that used to calculate the process safety lagging indicator can be either based on the total 
work hours or process related criteria such as production quantity (Wang, 2012).  
 
Process safety leading indicators are forward-looking measurements of the process 
safety system. These indicators works to identify the deficiencies and weakness in the 
process safety system before an incident occurs. The CCPS defined the leading 
indicators as “A forward looking set of metrics which indicate the performance of the 
key work processes, operating discipline, or layers of protection that prevent incidents” 
(CCPS, 2011). The process safety leading indicators work as early indications of a new 
hazard developed or a failure in any protection layer. Some examples of process safety 
indicators include overdue preventive maintenance items, open HAZOP items, failure in 
management of change (MOC), and rate of completed process safety training. The 
leading indicator can be either positive or negative, but it should work to identify the 
effectiveness of each protection layer over the time. Several process safety leading 
indicators and metrics shall be measured in order to do an accurate evaluation of any 
protection layer such as mechanical integrity or process hazard analysis. Process safety 
leading indicators are used mainly to improve the process safety system rather than 
compare different industrial organizations. Measuring the process safety leading 
indicators is challenging compared to lagging indicators because it is the measurement 
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for something before it occurs. However, safety cannot be granted by relying only on 
lagging indicators. Process safety leading indicators are a proactive approach to prevent 
process events and accidents before they occur.  
 
Both leading and lagging process safety indicators are very important for measuring and 
improving the process safety system, and both should be used in the process safety 
performance assessment. There is no clear cut line between the leading and lagging 
indicators. Some process safety lagging indicators can be considered leading indicators 
to a catastrophic incident. Near-misses can be classified as leading indicators because 
they work as early indications of some deficiencies in the process safety system and 
don’t have a significant sequence to be classified as lagging indicators. On other hand, 
near-misses can be classified also as lagging indicators because they already occurred.  
 
2.3 Developing Process Safety Indicators Guidelines 
The tragic events of BP Texas City Refinery disaster on March 23, 2005 brought the 
attention of the petrochemical industry to the importance of developing and maintaining 
process safety indicators. Several organizations started to put a lot of effort in 
establishing some guidance for developing process safety indicators, such as United 
Kingdom Health and Safety Executive (UK HSE), Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) and 
American Petroleum Institute (API). The following section shows a brief description 
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about the most common guidelines that currently are used to develop process safety 
indicators. 
 
2.3.1 Developing Process Safety Indicators by UK HSE; HSG254 
This guideline for developing process safety indicators was created jointly by the United 
Kingdom Health and Safety Executive (UK HSE) and the Chemical Industries 
Association (CIA) in 2006. The guide was designed mainly for the chemical and highly 
hazardous industries. The main objective of this guideline is to measure process safety 
indicators in order to assure that all hazards and risks are controlled correctly. The 
guideline uses “dual assurance” concept to measure the functionality and effectiveness 
of risk control systems using leading indicators for active monitoring and lagging 
indicator for reactive monitoring. Active monitoring should give feedback about the risk 
control performance before occurrence of an incident, while the reactive monitoring 
should give feedback about the risk control performance after the incident (HSE, 2006). 
Also, the guideline uses the “Swiss-Cheese” model to illustrate the leading and lagging 
indicators rules in discovering the deficiencies in the risk control system that are 
represented by multiple process safety protection layers. The leading indicators should 
detect the deficiencies (holes) in the risk control system during normal checks and 
inspections(HSE, 2006). The lagging indicators should detect deficiencies (holes) in risk 
control systems after the incident. The guideline establishes six major steps to measure 
process safety performance that are shown below:  
 Step 1: Set up leader and team  
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 Step 2: Develop the scope 
 Step 3: Define the risk control systems and lagging indicators 
 Step 4: Identify critical components and leading indicators  
 Step 5: Collect data and information 
 Step 6: Review the performance result  
The new main ideas of this guideline include development of process safety leading 
indicators, and using the “dual assurance” concept to measure the effectiveness of risk 
control systems. Also, the guideline identifies the immediate causes of all possible 
hazardous scenarios and the existing protection layers to control these hazards (HSE, 
2006).   
 
2.3.2 Guidance on Developing Safety Performance Indicators by OECD 
This guidance was prepared in 2008 by the Environment, Health and Safety (EHS) 
Division of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to 
develop the Safety Performance Indicator (SPI) program. The main objectives of this 
program are to provide early warnings for all deficiencies in the safety system that may 
develop over time and define the corrective actions that shall be taken. The SPI program 
is represented by a process of seven steps, which are: (1) set up a team; (2) define the 
key issues; (3) develop lagging indicators; (4) develop leading metrics; (5) collect the 
data and information; (6) define the corrective action; and (7) review the safety 
performance indicators (OECD, 2008). The SPI program recommends identifying the 
main issues of concerns and potential hazards using the process hazard analysis (PHA) 
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technique such as HAZOP, what-if analysis, and layers of protection analysis. The 
lagging and leading indicators should be developed based on most critical risk controls 
to reflect a clear measurement of safety performance (OECD, 2008). 
 
The main new contribution in this guideline includes focusing on the corrective actions 
by adding a separate step in the process of development safety performance indicators. 
Also, the guideline priorities the hazards and risk controls based on possible scenarios, 
contributions to potential incidents, and likely consequences (OECD, 2008).  
 
2.3.3 Process Safety Leading and Lagging Metrics by CCPS 
This guideline was initially published in 2008 and revised in 2010 to be aligned with 
API RP 754, “Process Safety Performance Indicators for the Refineries and 
Petrochemical industries”. This publication introduces the concept of the “Process Safety 
Metric Pyramid,” which consists of three main parts; lagging metrics in the top, leading 
metrics in the bottom, and near-misses are located in the middle of the pyramid. Failure 
of layers of protection and the “Swiss Cheese” model were used to develop the lagging 
and leading metrics. The lagging metrics are represented by the failure of multiple 
protection layers, while the leading indicators are represented by the failure of a single 
protection layer, or a deficiency “hole” within a single protection layer (CCPS, 2011). 
Different process safety incidents rates were introduced in this publication using a 
severity categorization of each indicator. The publication developed leading indicators 
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for major elements in the safety system including mechanical integrity, management of 
change, action item follow-up, and process safety training (CCPS, 2011). 
  
2.3.4 Guidelines for Process Safety Metrics by CCPS 
This publication was issued in 2010. The objective of this publication was to provide 
guidelines for different levels with the organization on how to develop and improve 
process safety indicators. This publication tried to bring together all previous efforts that 
had been done on the development of process safety indicators including the UK HSE 
and OECD guidelines. This publication identifies different procedures to select the 
process safety leading and lagging indicators such as identifying the weaknesses in the 
process safety system using experience judgment or data analysis. Process hazard 
analysis, incident investigations, audits, and process safety system baseline surveys can 
be used to identify the weaknesses in the process safety system. This guideline 
highlighted the importance of communicating the process safety indicator measurements 
on a frequent basis. Different process safety indicators should be communicated to 
different levels of the organization depending on their responsibilities, objectives and 
roles (CCPS, 2010). 
 
2.3.5 API RP 754; Process Safety Performance Indicators for the Refining and 
Petrochemical Industries 
This recommended practice was issued by the American Petroleum Institute in 2010. 
The main objective of this publication is to identify process safety leading and lagging 
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indicators in refining and petrochemical industries. The new concept in this publication 
is that process safety indicators are classified into four main tiers that are represented by 
the process safety incident pyramid as shown in Figure 1. The top of the pyramid is 
mostly lagging indicators, whereas the bottom of the pyramid is mostly leading 
indicators. The classification of the process safety indicators into four tiers was based on 
the level of consequence (API, 2010).  
 
Figure 1. Process Safety Indicators Pyramid (API, 2010) 
 
Tier 1 is represented by loss of primary containment (LOPC) with greatest consequence, 
while Tier 2 is represented by loss of primary containment (LOPC) with lesser 
consequence. Tier 3 is designed to be used internally and is represented by process 
safety system challenges such as exceeding the safe operating limit. Tier 4 is designed to 
reflect of facility-specific barriers and performance objectives. Both of Tiers 1 and 2 
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should be reported annually to the community and emergency management team of the 
specific facility. This recommended practice identified different procedures to select the 
process safety indicators including process hazard analysis and risk assessment, incident 
investigation and analysis, and shared lessons learned from outside parties (API, 2010).  
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    3. PROCESS SAFETY LEADING INDICATORS AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
FACTORS 
  
The development of process safety indicators is the key to improve the process safety 
system. Both leading and lagging indicators have a major contribution in measuring and 
improving the process safety system. It is essential for petrochemical industries to focus 
on leading indicators to prevent process safety incidents or to reduce the severity of 
these incidents. Process safety leading indicators are forward-looking and proactive 
indicators that can identify the deficiencies and weaknesses in the process safety system 
before an incident occurs.   
 
3.1 Difficulties in Developing Process Safety Leading Indicators 
The development and measurement of process safety indicators would require a lot of 
effort and analysis compared to process safety lagging indicators. The lagging indicators 
are easier to measure because they represent a measurement of specific process safety 
events that already occurred.  On other hand, process safety leading indicators are more 
challenging because they are based on the prediction measurements related to the 
probability of process safety incidents in the future.  There are several challenges to 
develop process safety leading indicators that include leadership commitment and 
support, data collections, continuous monitoring of measurements, and selecting the 
most effective indicators. In this section, the main difficulties of developing process 
safety leading indicators will be explained in detail. 
 18 
 
3.1.1 Leadership and Management Commitment 
Leadership and management support are essential in developing and monitoring process 
safety leading indicators. Leadership and management play key roles in the 
implementation and reinforcement of the process safety measurement program. Effective 
engagement of senior management has a major impact in encouraging the accurate 
reporting of the process safety data. Corporate management shall review and 
communicate the measurement of process safety leading indicators frequently with all 
levels of the organization. These measurements shall be used as a baseline measurement 
of the company process safety instead of using personnel injury rates or other lagging 
indicators.  The main objective of process safety leading indicators is to identify and 
detect the faults and deficiencies within the process safety system of the industrial 
facility. However, detection alone is not sufficient and would require leadership and 
management support to rectify these deficiencies and verify that these faults are fixed 
properly (CCPS, 2010). 
 
3.1.2. Data Collection 
Collection of the process safety data and information is one of the major challenges that 
the petrochemical industry faced during the development of process safety leading 
indicators. In the petrochemical industry, there is a big variance between what can be 
measured and what should be measured.  Most of the collection data systems were 
designed to collect direct information about the personnel safety system such as injuries, 
fatalities and motor vehicle accidents. This data collection system can be modified easily 
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to collect the data related to process safety lagging indicators such as gas releases, fires 
and explosions because it is direct and simple to collect. However, the existing system is 
difficult to be adapted to collect the process safety leading indicator data. A lot of effort 
will be required to build an independent automated data collection system for process 
safety that includes leading indicators data and analysis. Such a data collection system 
shall be designed to deal with indirect data and analysis related to process safety leading 
indicators. It is expected to be costly and requires a lot of time and development updates. 
For an effective system, employees within different organizational levels should be 
trained on how to collect and report the process safety data. The effective training will 
help to communicate the right data and to keep consistency (Kenan & Kadri, 2014).  
 
3.1.3. Continuous Monitoring 
The measures of process safety leading indicators would require continuous monitoring 
to ensure that all potential hazards or faults in the process system will be identified in a 
timely manner to take corrective actions before an incident occurs. The deficiency in the 
monitoring system will result in a delay in detecting potential deficiencies in the process 
safety system that may lead to high consequence events. There are two main types of 
monitoring, which are either active or reactive monitoring. Active monitoring is used to 
provide measures of process safety performance before an incident occurs, while 
reactive monitoring provides measures of process safety performance after the incidents 
(HSE, 2006). The petrochemical industry should rely heavily on the active monitoring of 
critical process safety leading indicators. The monitoring system effectiveness is 
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expected to decrease gradually as the number of the tracked process safety indicators 
increase (HSE, 2006). The petrochemical industrial organizations should focus on the 
monitoring of limited critical process safety leading indicators that have a great impact 
on process safety and provide acceptable accurate measures about the status of the 
process safety system. Monitoring of the process safety leading indicators should be a 
cost-effective process by monitoring few indicators that are sufficient to provide 
accurate and sufficient process safety measures. 
 
3.1.4. Indicators Definitions 
Process safety leading indicators have several definitions across a wide variety of 
guidelines. There are more general and vague words in these definitions that are causing 
different understanding among the petrochemical process industry. Some of the metrics 
that are classified as leading indicators in some companies are classified as lagging 
indicators or near-misses in other companies. Each organization has different 
interpretations about the meaning and goal of process safety metrics. Also, additional 
subsystem classifications of the process safety indicators resulted in adding more layers 
of complexity in understanding the indicator definition. In API RP 754 guideline, a lot of 
petrochemical industrial organizations struggled in classifying the process safety leading 
indicators between safety system challenges or performance indicators (Kenan & Kadri, 
2014). 
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3.2 Limitations of the Current Methods 
The major limitation in developing process safety leading indicators is the gap between 
the current guidelines and their implantations in the actual process industrial fields. The 
implementations of the current guidelines would require a lot of effort, time, cost, and 
expertise, which are challenging in most petrochemical organizations. So, most of the 
companies try to implement these guidelines based on their limited available resources, 
which creates many deficiencies in their measurements of process safety leading 
indicators. As a result, most of these industrial companies try to develop process safety 
indicators that lack either systematic approaches or proactive approaches (Khawaji, 
2012). 
 
The current guidelines heavily depend on the traditional hazard analysis techniques or 
incident analysis techniques to develop process safety indicators. These techniques are 
focusing more on the technical side and component failures in the process system. 
Management and organizational factors are ignored normally during developing process 
safety indicators using these techniques (Leveson, 2015).  Also, the traditional hazard 
analysis techniques are mostly focused in superficial causes rather than the fundamental 
root causes. A single series of linear events are normally assumed, which doesn’t 
represent the system complexity of the petrochemical industry (Khawaji, 2012).  
 
Selection of the appropriate process safety leading indicators is one of the main concerns 
that the petrochemical industrial facilities encountered. Most of these facilities struggled 
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with identifying the correct number of process safety leading indicators that they should 
develop and monitor. This is to ensure that there are not too many or too few. The 
petrochemical industrial facilities have large variations in the number of developed 
process safety indicators, ranging from three leading indicators to 28 leading indicators 
as per the process safety leading indicators survey that was conducted by the center for 
chemical process safety (CCPS) in February 2013 (Kenan & Kadri, 2014).  Too few 
process safety leading indicators will result in inaccurate measurement of a process 
safety system and several faults may not be detected, while too many process safety 
indicators will result in excessive monitoring and measurement of process safety 
indicators. However, accurate measurements of the process safety leading indicators will 
decrease as the number of monitored leading indicators increase because each leading 
indicator would require a lot of effort to be measured and monitored. 
 
Monitoring the developed process safety leading indicators is another key concern that 
the petrochemical industry encountered in development of process safety leading 
indicators. Process safety control systems may degrade over time and process safety 
leading indicators should discover this degradation and weakness within the process 
safety system before an incident occurs. So, it is very important to keep a continuous 
monitoring of critical process safety leading indicators to ensure the effectiveness of the 
existing process safety control systems and protection against any new hazards that may 
develop.                
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Another limitation in using the current guidelines to develop process safety leading 
indicators is the measurement accuracy for a specific process safety indicator. The 
recommended equations to calculate these leading indicators have many shortages and 
may not represent the actual status of measured elements. Qualitative metrics of the 
measured process safety indicators, which are mostly ignored, are as important as the 
quantitative metrics that are used normally to measure the process safety indicators. For 
example, the quality of the conducted management of change (MOC) or process hazard 
analysis (PHA) are very important to perform accurate measurement of these two 
elements. The number of conducted MOCs or PHAs may be misleading and do not 
represent the true measurement of these two elements.  Most of the petrochemical 
organizations lack accurate measurement of process safety leading indicators, which 
requires using several metrics to ensure accurate measurement of each leading indicator. 
These metrics should be both quantitative and qualitative, and should cover all parts of 
the measured process safety leading indicators. 
 
3.3 Importance of Organizational Factors in Process Safety  
Organizational factors have large effects on the process safety systems in petrochemical 
industrial facilities. These organization factors have great contributions in most of the 
process safety incidents. However, these organizations factors were ignored in many 
previous incident investigation reports. The organizational factors consist of a lot of 
elements, which include mechanical integrity, communication, management of change 
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(MOC), training program, personnel workload and safety culture. These organizational 
factors vary on their effects on the process safety system.  
 
The data collected by the International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP) was 
used to study and analyze the causal factors for the major incidents and near-misses in 
the oil and gas industries. The data was studied and analyzed over a period of four years, 
from 2010 to 2013, to evaluate the actual performance and variance of these causal 
factors across considerable period of time (OGP, 2014b). High potential events can be 
either an incident or a near-miss that has a potential to cause injuries, fatalities, or major 
damages. One or more causal factors were assigned to each high potential event. In 
2013, 124 high potential events were investigated and analyzed to be caused mainly by 
444 causal factors (OGP, 2014b). 
 
Organizational factors were found to be on the top of the list of causal factors for the 
high potential events. Out of the 124 high potential events in 2013, deficiencies in the 
mechanical integrity organizational factor were found to be the causal factor for 57 high 
potential events, where failure in the standards/procedures organization factor resulted in 
44 high potential events. Insufficient process hazard analysis and training/competence 
organizational factors caused 35 and 29 high potential events, respectively (OGP, 
2014b). Due to the variations of the analyzed high potential events over the four years, 
the data was normalized based on 100 high potential events in order to perform accurate 
comparisons between different causal factors. Table 1 summarizes the common 
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organizational factors contributed to major incidents and near-misses during the last four 
years based on data collected by OGP (OGP, 2014b). 
 
Table 1. Contribution of Organizational Factors in High Potential Events 
Causal Factor 
Number of Organizational Factors that Assigned as 
Causal Factors per 100 High Potential Events 
2013 2012 2011 2010 
Mechanical Integrity 46.6 37.9 36.2 38.1 
Procedures/Standards 35.5 32.0 29.0 38.1 
PHA/Risk Assessment 28.2 36.1 34.8 48.5 
MOC/Design 23.4 9.5 26.1 13.4 
Training 23.4 21.3 21.7 22.7 
Communication 21.0 21.7 22 19.6 
Supervision 19.4 26.0 26.1 32.0 
  
Organization factors had large contributions to the major incidents and near-misses as 
shown from the previous table. These organizations causal factors vary a lot in their 
contributions to the high potential events. These organizational factors can be ranked 
based on their effects in the following order: (1) mechanical integrity, (2) process hazard 
analysis/risk assessment, (3) procedures/standards, (4) Supervision, (5) 
training/competence, (6) communication, and (7) design/management of change (OGP, 
2014b). 
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3.4. BP Texas City Refinery Explosion Case Study 
A catastrophic explosion destroyed a considerable part of BP Texas City Refinery on 
March 23, 2005, where 15 workers were killed, 180 injured, and financial losses were 
estimated to be more than 1.5 billion dollars. A large quantity of flammable liquid and 
gas was released through an open blowdown drum vent during the startup operation of 
the isomerization unit, which resulted in a massive vapor cloud explosion 
(VCE).  Incident investigation report highlighted several deficiencies in the process 
safety system of BP Texas City Refinery that lead to this disaster (CSB, 2007).  
 
Most of organizational and safety system deficiencies that lead to this disaster existed 
several years before the incident. These deficiencies could be detected easily if there 
were an effective process safety indicator system. There was no appropriate system or 
program to measure the process safety performance in BP Texas City Refinery. The 
existing safety system focused mainly on injury rates to measure the effectiveness of the 
process safety system. The low personnel injury rate was a misleading indicator for the 
process safety performance (CSB, 2007). One of the major Baker Panel investigation 
report recommendations was to develop process safety leading and lagging indicators 
program (Baker, Leveson et al., 2007). 
 
The unsafe location of the occupied trailers next to the isomerization unit that was 
handling hazardous and flammable materials indicated insufficient management of 
change (MOC) process and failure of the hazard identification program (CSB, 2007). 
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Most of the fatalities were inside or around the occupied trailers and they were not aware 
about the startup of the isomerization unit which showed a failure of hazard 
communication element. Major flammable material releases occurred eight times during 
the recent years prior to the incident without a proper investigation and analysis (CSB, 
2007). The cost-cutting preference by the management resulted in less investment in 
process tools development and more dependence on the operators’ interactions. Also, the 
number of operators was reduced significantly to satisfy the cost-cutting objectives. The 
board operator was handling two major process units in addition to the isomerization 
unit which all required a close attention. The board operator was working in a 12 hour 
shift for the last 29 consecutive days prior to the incident. The lead operator was in a 12 
hour shift for 37 consecutive days and was overloaded with several activities including 
following-up with contactors, training new operators, and working on the startup of the 
isomerization unit. There were clear indications of operator excessive workloads that 
resulted in the operators’ fatigues. The management cost-cutting plan had a direct 
negative impact on training, staffing, and mechanical integrity. The management worked 
to achieve the cost-cutting goals discarding their effects on the process safety 
performance (CSB, 2007). 
 
The startup procedure for the isomerization unit was outdated and not followed which 
resulted in several mistakes which lead to overfilling of the raffinate splitter tower of the 
isomerization unit. Deviations from the written operations and maintenance procedures 
were the normal practice in the BP Texas City Refinery facility (Baker et al., 2007).    
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The unit supervisor left early in the day of the incident without an experienced personnel 
or adequate supervision at the site during the critical startup operation. Also, there was a 
failure of communicating critical startup process activities during the shift handover. The 
day lead operator left early and the night shift supervisor arrived late which indicate that 
face to face shift turnover was not conducted and shift log book was lack to a critical 
process information (CSB, 2007).  
  
There were several deficiencies in the design of the isomerization unit that include the 
raffinate splitter tower and blowdown drum. The level and quantity of the flammable 
material inside the raffinate splitter tower was unknown due to the limitation of the 
installed level indicator and lack of flow indicators on the inlet and outlet of the splitter 
tower (CSB, 2007). Two redundant level indicators with alarms should be installed in 
such critical splitter tower in case of failure or malfunction of one of them.  Also, the 
raffinate splitter tower should be provided with ab automatic interlock to prevent 
overfilling of the splitter tower. Releasing of flammable material into the atmosphere 
through the blowdown drum vent was a hazardous action and an indication of a design 
deficiency in the pressure relief system. The relief valves should be connected to a 
proper flare system.  An effective process hazard analysis would discover such hazards 
and would work to eliminate them with proper controlling measures (CSB, 2007). 
 
There were several deficiencies in the mechanical integrity of BP Texas City Refinery 
facility where some instrumentations and equipment were not working properly. The 
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pressure control valve of the raffinate splitter tower was malfunction, and level indicator 
was not calibrated. The facility was lacking to a preventive maintenance program and 
there was a total dependence on responding to failures only.  In addition, the repair 
integrity was inadequate where the same repaired components failed several times within 
short time (CSB, 2007). 
   
In conclusion, there were several deficiencies in the process safety system can be 
detected and rectified prior to the incident. An efficient process safety indicator system 
would be able to detect and fix these deficiencies and faults. The leadership safety 
culture and competence would have a high impact on the process safety performance. 
Releases of flammable material from the blowdown drum were reported several times 
but the incident and near-miss investigations failed to prevent reoccurrence of this 
hazardous event. The incident investigation report highlighted deficiencies in several 
organizations factors that include mechanical integrity, operational procedures, 
management of change, process hazard analysis, communication, training, safety culture 
and personnel workload (CSB, 2007). 
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4. PROCESS SAFETY DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
There were several difficulties in collecting the process safety leading indicators data for 
various reasons that will be discussed in this section. A cost-effective method will be 
developed by selecting a limited number of leading indicators that have a great impact 
on the process safety performance. An effective near-misses investigation and analysis 
play important role in measuring the process safety performance. Bayesian network 
technique will be used to study the probability reasoning of different organizational 
factors that cause an incident. Numerous quantitative and qualitative metrics will be used 
to perform accurate measurements of the most effective leading indicators.   
 
4.1 Data Collection Difficulties 
The collection of process safety leading indicators data is a difficult task. Most of the 
petrochemical industrial companies do not have a sufficient data collection system to 
analyze process safety measures. The process safety leading indicators would require a 
lot of time and effort to be measured (Kenan & Kadri, 2014). A large database would be 
required to do a proper research to analyze process safety data. There were two main 
types of difficulties in collection these data. The first type of difficulties is the process 
safety data unavailability. The second type of difficulties is the willingness of 
petrochemical industrial companies to share their process safety data.        
 
A new developed collection data system would be required to conduct an effective 
collection of process safety data. Most of the current safety data systems are dealing with 
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both process safety data and personnel safety data at the same time. This will make it 
very difficult to accurately analyze and discuss process safety data.  A standalone 
process safety data collection system would be required in order to achieve a correct 
measurement and analysis of these data. The survey conducted by the Center of 
Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) in 2013 indicated that the industrial facilities are still in 
the experimental phase of collecting process safety data and development of process 
safety leading metrics (Kenan & Kadri, 2014).  
 
Many petrochemical industrial facilities are not willing to share their process safety 
leading indicators data with the public. These companies may think that the releasing 
some of these data may have direct effects on the integrity of these data which used 
mainly for improvement purposes. Also, these process safety leading indicators may be 
incorrectly interpreted by the public, where these data are used as an improvement tool 
rather than a measuring tool. In addition, most of petrochemical industrial companies 
started to put some attention on collecting the process safety data in 2010 after releasing 
of API RP 754, Process Safety Performance Indicators for the Refining and 
Petrochemical Industries. There have only been a few years of implementations for most 
of the companies where a lot of audits and updates involved in the process safety leading 
indicators systems. These continuous changes and updates to the system make it difficult 
to report the variable data of process safety leading indicators. In addition, API RP 754 
only requires all petrochemical industrial companies to report the lagging indicators to 
the public (API, 2010). 
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4.2 Alternative Data Collection Method 
The process safety leading indicators can be developed through three main techniques 
which are hazard analysis, incident investigations, and shared lessons learned (CCPS, 
2010). In the case of a lack of reported process safety leading indicators, a 
comprehensive incident investigation and analysis database would be a good 
replacement procedure to analyze the process safety leading indicators data. The incident 
investigation and analysis data base should be focused on the real causes rather than 
superficial causes. Also, the incident investigation should look for the process safety 
control system that degraded over the time. The effective incident investigation and 
analysis should provide adequate data that required to perform a proper analysis and 
study of leading indicator variables. The only negative property with using this 
technique is the lack of a proper mathematical relation between leading indicators events 
and lagging indicators events, where several leading indicators events would not cause 
incidents or near-misses.   
 
The database collected by the International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP) 
was used to study and analyze the process safety leading indicators events using the 
incident investigation of process safety incidents and near-misses. The database includes 
causal factors of high potential events for a four-year period, from 2010 to 2013. The 
investigations were conducted for the high potential incidents and near-misses that may 
result of harm to people or equipment. These investigations analyzed these high potential 
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events and assign one or more causal factors for each event. The database was collected 
from around 50 industrial companies around the world representing OGP members.  
 
The causal factors data were classified into two main classifications, which are act and 
process causal factors. First, the act causal factors include mistakes, slips and lapses 
related to human actions, e.g. an operator did not perform the required action or did a 
wrong action. The causal factors related to the act causal factor classification are more 
categorized into the human error related to following procedures, using equipment/tools, 
lack of attention and protective method failure. Second main classification is the process 
causal factors which involve equipment/tools failures, organizational deficiencies, 
physical hazards, and defective protection system (OGP, 2014a). 
 
In 2010, about 97 high potential events were caused by 400 causal factors. The top 
causal factors were process hazard analysis, mechanical integrity, procedures/standards, 
supervision, and training/competence, respectively (OGP, 2014b). Around 69 high 
potential events were caused by 317 causal factors in 2011. The top causal factor was 
mechanical integrity, followed by process hazard analysis, procedure/standards, 
management of change, and supervision, in that order (OGP, 2014b).  
 
In 2012, about 169 high potential events were caused by 603 causal factors. The top 
three causal factors were the same as in the previous year. The fourth and fifth causal 
factors were training/competence and communication, respectively (OGP, 2014b). In 
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2103, there were 124 high potential events were investigated and analyzed. These high 
potential events were caused by 444 different causal factors. The top five causal factors 
were mechanical integrity, procedures/standards, process hazard analysis, 
training/competence, and management of change, respectively(OGP, 2014b). Table 2 
below summarizes the most common causal factors that lead to high potential incidents 
and near-misses during the four-year period as per OGP data base.  
 
Table 2. Top Causal Factors from 2010 to 2013 
Causal Factor 
Number of High Potential Events per Causal Factor 
2013 2012 2011 2010 
Mechanical Integrity 57 64 25 37 
Procedures/Standards 44 54 20 37 
PHA/Risk Assessment 35 61 24 47 
Competence/Training 29 36 15 22 
MOC/Design 29 16 18 13 
Communication 26 36 15 19 
Supervision 24 44 18 31 
 
4.3 Analysis of Most Effective Causal Factors 
Monitoring large number of leading indicators would require a lot of time and effort. So, 
it is very important to do a cost-effective analysis by studying the most effective leading 
indicators that have great impacts on the process safety performance. The collected 
database in the previous section should be normalized due to the different number of 
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investigated high potential events across the four-year period. Table 3 below shows the 
top causal factors per 100 high potential events.   
  
Table 3. Most Effective Causal Factors of High Potential Events 
Causal Factor 
Number of Organizational Factors that Assigned as 
Causal Factors per 100 High Potential Events 
2013 2012 2011 2010 
Mechanical Integrity 46.0 37.9 36.2 38.1 
Procedures/Standards 35.5 32.0 29.0 38.1 
PHA/Risk Assessment 28.2 36.1 34.8 48.5 
Competence/Training 23.4 21.3 21.7 22.7 
MOC/Design 23.4 9.5 26.1 13.4 
Communication 21.0 21.3 21.7 19.6 
Supervision 19.4 26.0 26.1 32.0 
 
The most effective causal factors can be listed in the following order:  
(1) Mechanical integrity (MI) 
(2) Process hazard analysis (PHA) and risk assessment 
(3) Procedures and standards 
 36 
 
(4) Supervision 
(5) Training and competence  
(6) Communication 
(7) Management of Change (MOC) and design 
 
Each causal factor had different effects on causing high potential events. The effect of 
each factor varies from one year to another, but the top three causal factors are the same 
over the four-year period. The three most effective causal factors are mechanical 
integrity, procedures/standards, and process hazard analysis organizational factors.     
 
4.4 Importance of Near-misses Analysis 
  A process safety near-miss can be defined as any event that has the potential to cause a 
process safety incident but does not meet the definition and criteria of process safety 
lagging indicators or process safety incidents. A process safety near-miss can be either a 
release of hazardous material below the threshold limit or a failure of a protection 
system (CCPS, 2011).  An example of a near-miss is when a flammable gas leak resulted 
in the release of flammable gas in quantities below the threshold limit and there is no 
harm caused by the gas leak. Another example is a failure of a safety protection system, 
such as relief devices, emergency shutdown system, or gas detection system, that does 
not result of a process safety incident (CCPS, 2011).   
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Near-misses can be classified as leading and lagging process safety indicators at the 
same time because there are some common factors between near-misses and both types 
of indicators. A near-miss can be classified as process safety lagging indicator because it 
describes an event that already occurred. Also, a near-miss can be classified as a process 
safety leading indicator because it works as an indication for a more serious event. In 
both classifications, near-misses shall be investigated and analyzed properly to identify 
all associated hazards, risks and causal factors that may have the potential to cause high 
potential process safety incidents. So, an appropriate analysis of process safety near-
misses can be the main reason to avoid a lot of process safety incidents (CCPS, 2010).       
 
Figure 2. Severity and Revalidation of Indicators in Process Safety Pyramid 
 
Major incidents could be prevented by tracking, analyzing and reducing near-misses and 
low-consequence process safety events (Prem, 2010). The near-miss analysis is a critical 
element in an effective process safety system. A single process safety incident is 
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normally proceeded by multiple near-misses that share the same causal factors and 
process safety deficiencies (Oktem, Seider et al., 2013).  Near-misses are located in the 
middle of the process safety pyramid between the lagging and leading indicators as 
shown in Figure 2. The severity of process safety events increases as one goes from the 
bottom of the pyramid to the top. So, it is easier to detect a near-miss than it is to detect a 
leading indicator because near-misses have higher severity.  
 
A near-miss investigation and analysis system should be part of a process safety 
management system. The near-miss investigation system should include the 
identification and reporting of all near-misses within the industrial facility. This 
important step will require specific training and establishing a good safety culture. After 
the reporting, near-misses should be filtered out to identify the high potential near-
misses that require further analysis. These high potential near-misses should be analyzed 
by a knowledgeable and experienced team to identify the causal factors of each near-
miss. A list of action items should be generated to resolve all deficiencies within the 
system and prevent the recurrence of a similar high potential process safety event. A 
follow-up should be conducted to ensure that all recommendations and action items are 
properly completed (Muermann & Oktem, 2002).   
 
4.5 Bayesian Network to Measure Process Safety Performance 
The Bayesian network technique is used to study the reasoning probability between 
different related variables in a complex system. It is an excellent technique to study the 
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relations between different causal factors and their likelihood to cause high potential 
incidents or near-misses. The Bayesian network will be built based on the OGP database 
of most effective causal factors of high potential events. The database of previous 
incidents and near-misses will be used as weighting factors of the probability of a high 
potential event. The AgenaRisk software will be used to study the effects of different 
organizational factors on the probability of a high potential incident. When all 
organizational factors are maintained in a good condition, the probability of having a 
high potential event will be very low, around 2% as shown in Figure 3 below.  
 
 
Figure 3. High Potential Events Caused by Organizational Factors    
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The previous AgenaRisk diagram shows that there is still a very small percentage (2%) 
of having a process safety incident due to standard deviations and the effects of other 
causal factors. Failure of one or more of these major causal factors will result in 
increasing the probability of having a process safety incident. 
 
The BP Texas City Refinery explosion can be illustrated and studied using the previous 
AgenaRisk model. There was a failure of process hazard analysis where the major 
consequences of the high liquid levels in the raffinate splitter tower and the blowdown 
drum were not identified. Also, there was a major failure in the mechanical integrity 
system where many instrumentations were malfunctioning and not calibrated. The 
startup procedure was not updated and not followed by operators. Siting of the occupied 
trailers was an indication of a failure of the management of change (MOC) factor. The 
absence of a qualified supervisor during critical startup operations led to a failure of the 
supervision protection layer. The communication system failed due to shift turnover 
deficiencies. All these failure can be represented in the AgenaRisk model to calculate the 
process incident probability as shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Failure of Organizational Factors Lead to BP Texas City Disaster 
 
The probability of having a process safety incident has increased from 2% to be more 
than 94%, which is a very high probability indicating a certain occurrence of a major 
process safety incident. Failure of most of these organization factors could have been 
noticed and observed prior to the explosion.  
 
Organizational factors have different effects on the probabilities of high potential events. 
Some of the organizational factors contribute more than the other to cause process safety 
incidents. The different effects can be studied using the developed AgenaRisk model.  
The model should be updated to reflect the occurrence of high potential events with 
100% probability to observe the organization factors’ probabilities as shown in Figure 5. 
 42 
 
 
Figure 5. Most Likely Explanation of Having High Potential Events 
 
The most likely explanation (MLE) of having a high potential incident is the mechanical 
integrity organizational factor with 63.5%. It is followed by the process hazard analysis 
and procedures/standards organizational factors with probabilities of 62.2% and 61.3%, 
respectively. 
 
The previous analysis technique can be used also to select the most effective leading 
indicators. Cost-effective selection of leading indicators is an important factor during the 
development of process safety measures. Maintaining one effective leading indicator can 
be more efficient than maintaining two less effective leading indicators, as shown in 
Figure 6 and Figure 7. Failure of the mechanical integrity organizational factor would 
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result in increase of the probability of high potential events to be 11.4%, as shown in 
Figure 6. On the other hand, the failure of two leading indicators, which are MOC/design 
and communication organizational factors, would result in only 10.4%, as shown in 
Figure 7.      
 
 
Figure 6. Effect of Mechanical Integrity Failure on High Potential Events 
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Figure 7. Failure of MOC/Design and Communication Organizational Factors 
 
In addition, focusing on two effective organizational factors can be more efficient than 
focusing on three organizational factors. The probability of high potential events would 
greatly increase to 33.1% as result of co-failures of two effective organizational factors, 
mechanical integrity and PHA, as shown in Figure 8. In contrast, failures of three less 
effective organizational factors (communication, training, and MOC) would result in 
only 21.1% probability of having a high potential event, as shown in Figure 9. So, the 
effects of the mechanical integrity and PHA organization factors are much higher than 
the effect of all three of the previous mentioned organizational factors by more than 1.5 
times. 
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Figure 8. Effects of Failures of Mechanical Integrity and PHA Elements 
 
 
Figure 9. Failure of Three Less-Effective Organization Factors 
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4.6 Quantitative Assessment of Highly Effective Causal Factors  
The Bayesian network technique discussed in the previous section provides a good 
comparison analysis in general. However, there are two main concerns with the previous 
assessment. First, the reported high potential events may include some incidents that are 
not related to process safety and need to be verified. Secondly, the previous analysis did 
not consider the interactions and dependent relationship between the different 
organizational factors.  
 
In order to check the reliability of the causal factors data, a more detailed analysis would 
be required. All the listed incident investigation reports within the International 
Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP) data were reviewed to check the accuracy of 
associated results. The descriptions of some of the listed events were found to be related 
to transportation incidents and near-misses, which should not be classified as process 
safety events. Also, there are some process safety events found incomplete and without 
assigned causal factors (OGP, 2014c). 
 
Based on the intensive review of 2013 OGP data, there were 95 process safety events 
were investigated. The causal factors were not assigned for 28 process safety events out 
of the 95 events. The remaining 67 process safety events were analyzed, and one or more 
causal factors were assigned for each event. Table 4 below shows the most common 
seven causal factors for the high potential process safety events according to 2013 OGP 
data report (OGP, 2014c). 
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Table 4. Most Common Root Causes of Process Safety Events 
Causal Factor 
High Potential Process Safety Events 
Number % 
Mechanical Integrity 30 46.9 
Procedure/Standards 29 45.3 
PHA/Risk Assessment 28 43.8 
MOC/Design 22 34.4 
Competence/Training 15 23.4 
Communication 13 20.3 
Supervision 12 18.8 
 
Main comparisons were performed between the original data and the revised data to 
check and verify the accuracy of the previous results and conclusions. In general, the 
new revised data verified the sequence of the most common causal factors that lead to 
high potential events found in previous analysis. As found in previous results, the most 
effective causal factors were found to be mechanical integrity, procedures/standards, 
process hazard analysis, design/management of change, training/competence, 
communications, and supervisions. The rate of the high potential process safety events 
caused by the mechanical integrity was found to be 46.9% which is almost the same in 
both data analysis. Procedures/standards organizational factor was the causal factors for 
45.3% of the high potential process safety events, which is approximately 10% higher 
than the previous analysis in the original data. Process hazard analysis and managements 
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of changes causal factors were the root causes for 43.8% and 34.4% of the process safety 
events, compared to their causal factor rates of 28% and 23% in the original data 
analysis. Training/competence, communication, and supervision causal factors caused 
23.4%, 20.3%, and 18.8%, respectively, of the high potential process safety events. 
These three causal factors were almost the same as calculated in the original data 
analysis. Figure 10 below shows a general comparison between the high potential safety 
events of the original analysis and high potential process safety events of the revised 
analysis that are caused by the most effective organizational factors in year 2013. 
   
 
Figure 10. Comparison between Original and Revised Data Analysis 
 
The analysis of root causes of the high potential process safety events are more 
complicated because there are a lot of intersections between the contributed causal 
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factors, where most of the high potential process safety events are caused by more than 
one causal factor. So, further analysis would be required to study the single independent 
effect of each causal factor and the intersections between each two causal factors. 
 
The common high potential process safety events that caused by failure of both 
mechanical integrity and procedures/standards were found to be nine process safety 
events. Twelve high potential process safety events were caused by deficiencies in both 
mechanical integrity and process hazard analysis causal factors. The failure in both 
procedures/standards and process hazard analysis organizational factors were the root 
causes of fourteen high potential process safety events.  
 
A cost-effective analysis would be required to measure most effective organizational 
factors and their best combinations. The combination of the mechanical integrity and 
procedures/standards organizational factors resulted in 50 out of 64 high potential 
process safety events, which represented 78.1% of the total process safety events. Also, 
about 71.9% of high potential process safety events resulted from the combination of the 
mechanical integrity and process hazard analysis causal factors. The process hazard 
analysis and procedures/standards causal factors caused 68.8% of the high potential 
process safety events. About 64.1% of the total high potential process events resulted 
from the failure in the design/management of change and mechanical integrity 
organizational factors. Table 5 below shows the most effective combinations of two 
organizational factors on the high potential process safety events. 
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Table 5. Effects of Combining Two Organizational Factors 
Combining Two Causal Factors High Potential Process 
Safety Events 
1
st
 Factor 2
nd
 Factor Number % 
Mechanical Integrity Procedure/Standards 50 78.1% 
Mechanical Integrity PHA/Risk Assessment 46 71.9% 
Procedures/Standards PHA/Risk Assessment 44 68.8% 
Procedure/Standards MOC/Design 44 68.8% 
PHA/Risk Assessment MOC/Design 43 67.2% 
Mechanical Integrity MOC/Design 41 64.1% 
  
The combination of two organizational factors caused significant variable effects on the 
high potential process safety events as seen in Table 5.  The best dual combination was 
obtained when the mechanical integrity and procedures/standards causal factors were 
used, which resulted in 78.1% of the high potential process safety events. This analysis 
could be used to control and reduce the high potential process safety incidents by 
maintaining the effectiveness of related causal factors. In other words, retaining the 
effectiveness of the mechanical integrity and procedures/standards organizational factors 
will prevent or reduce the consequences of around 78.1% of process safety events.       
 
There were significantly different effects between the various combinations of causal 
factors. The combination of the mechanical integrity with procedures/standards causal 
factors was higher than the combination of the mechanical integrity with management of 
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change/design causal factors by about 14%. Also, the effects of dual combinations of 
causal factors were significantly higher than the effects of single causal factors. The 
single mechanical integrity causal factor caused 46.9% of high potential process safety 
events, which is very low compared with the dual combination of two causal factors, 
e.g., the mechanical integrity causal factor was less than the combination of the 
mechanical integrity with procedures/standards organizational factors by about 31%. 
 
The tri-combinations of causal factors were studied and evaluated using a cost-effective 
analysis. The combination of mechanical integrity, procedures/standards, and process 
hazard analysis was found to be the causes of 58 out of 64 high potential process safety 
events, which represents 90.6% of the total high potential process safety events. The 
combination of the mechanical integrity, procedures/standards, and design/management 
of change organizational factors resulted in 89.1% of the total high potential process 
safety events. About 84.4% of the high potential process safety events were caused by 
the combination of procedures/standards, process hazard analysis, and management of 
change/design organizational factors. In addition, the combination of mechanical 
integrity, process hazard analysis, and design/management of change organizational 
factors resulted in 84.4% of the high potential process safety events. Table 6 below 
shows the effects of tri-combinations of different organizational factors on occurrences 
of high potential process safety events. 
 
 52 
 
Table 6. Effects of Tri-Combinations of Organizational Factors on Process Safety  
Combining Three Causal Factors High Potential Process 
Safety Events 
1
st
 Factor 2
nd
 Factor 3
rd
 Factor Number % 
Mechanical 
Integrity 
Procedure/ 
Standards 
PHA/Risk 
Assessment 
58 90.6% 
Mechanical 
Integrity 
Procedure/ 
Standards 
MOC/Design 57 89.1% 
Procedure/ 
Standards 
PHA/Risk 
Assessment 
MOC/Design 54 84.4% 
Mechanical 
Integrity 
PHA/Risk 
Assessment 
MOC/Design 54 84.4% 
     
The best effective tri-combination of causal factors consisted of the mechanical integrity, 
procedures/standards, and process hazard analysis, which caused about 90.6% of the 
high potential process safety events. Table 6 clearly shows that there are small variances 
(less than 6%) between the different tri-combinations of main causal factors. On the 
other hand, there were noticeable differences between the dual combinations and tri-
combinations of organizational factors that reached more than 12% in most cases, if the 
combination of the mechanical integrity with procedures/standards was excluded. 
 
A tetra-combination of the most effective organizational factors was examined and 
found to result in 100% of the high potential process safety events. This highly efficient 
combination consisted of (1) mechanical integrity, (2) procedures/standards, (3) process 
hazard analysis, and (4) design/management of change organizational factors. The 
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different numbers of organizational factor combinations had variance effects on the 
process safety events. Figure 11 shows the rate of high potential process safety events 
that resulted from various single, dual, tri-, and tetra- combinations of the most effective 
organizational factors. 
 
 
Figure 11. Several Combinations of Most Effective Organizational Factors 
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4.7 Metrics to Measure Process Safety Indicators 
As evidenced in the last section, specific organizational factors highly influence the 
process safety incidents. A variety of metrics should be developed to measure theses 
organizational factors, and specifically qualitative and quantitative measures. In this 
section, comprehensive metrics will be developed for the most significant leading 
indicators that include the following organizational factors: 
 Mechanical Integrity 
 Standards/Procedures 
 Process Hazard Analysis/Risk Assessment 
 Management of Change/Design  
 
4.7.1 Mechanical Integrity 
Mechanical integrity greatly influences process safety performance. Failure of 
mechanical integrity was the root cause of many major process safety incidents. Most 
hazardous material leaks are due to failure of pipes/valves integrity or failure of proper 
inspection programs, both failures categorized under mechanical integrity program.  The 
analysis of 2013 OGP data report revealed that failure of mechanical integrity was a 
causal factor of about 47% of highly potential process safety incidents.  
 
Deficiencies in the mechanical integrity system can lead to major process safety 
disasters. In the BP Texas City Refinery explosion, the failure of level indication and 
alarm was one of the root causes that led to the overfilling of the splitter tower and 
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blowdown drum. A flammable material was released into the atmosphere and formed a 
vapor cloud of the flammable material. The cloud was ignited and the subsequent vapor 
cloud explosion killed 15 people and injured approximately 180 people. The deficiency 
in mechanical integrity of the modified temporary bypass released approximately 30 tons 
of cyclo-hexane in Flixborough, England, in 1974. A vapor cloud was formed and 
ignited, which resulted in a massive vapor cloud explosion with 28 fatalities, 36 injuries, 
damaging the entire facility (Crowl & Louvar, 2011).  
 
Mechanical integrity significantly connects with several subsectors within industrial 
facilities, including management, design, construction, engineering, operation, and 
maintenance. Also, mechanical integrity correlates to all structures and equipment within 
the industrial facility such as tanks, pumps, compressors, piping, heat exchangers, 
reactors, control valves, gas detectors, instrumentations, and firewater equipment 
(Sanders, 2011). 
 
The scope of any mechanical integrity program should maintain industrial facility assets 
during the complete life cycle and include design, installation, commissioning, 
operation, production, and mothballing. Equipment design is the first, baseline step in 
maintaining an effective and efficient mechanical integrity program that protects people, 
assets, and the environment. The design should comply with safety level standards that 
reflect best practices and technologies. The equipment design must be administered by 
qualified and certified engineers with experience in designing similar industrial systems. 
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Mechanical integrity during equipment design includes but is not limited to selection of 
the right material, capacity, support strength, operating pressure, and temperature. 
 
Mechanical integrity is also very important during the construction, installation, and 
normal operation of the industrial facility. Most equipment will not work as intended if 
not installed correctly, and of course installation entails a wide array of critical 
component, including sensitive instrumentation, detectors, controls, indicators, and 
flange connections. All equipment should be maintained during the normal operation of 
the industrial facility using scheduled preventive maintenance, high quality repairs, and 
regular inspection/testing. Equipment installation and maintenance should be performed 
by a qualified crew, and an approved procedure should be followed.  
 
Several metrics can be utilized to measure the process safety leading indicators of 
mechanical integrity. To simplify metrics development, mechanical integrity can be 
categorized into two main classifications: design/installation and ongoing mechanical 
integrity. These main classifications are further classified into smaller divisions below:  
1) Design/Installation Mechanical Integrity 
a. Design 
i. Designer qualification: rate/number of design implemented by 
uncertified designer 
ii. Design quality: rate/number of audit/inspection items related 
to design issues 
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iii. Material: equipment detected with incorrect design material  
b. Installation 
i. Installer qualification: rate/number of equipment was installed 
by uncertified crew 
ii. Installation procedure: rate/number of installation procedures 
that was not clear or not followed 
iii. Material: equipment installed with incorrect material 
 
2) Ongoing Mechanical Integrity 
a. Inspection 
i. Qualified Inspectors: rate/number of uncertified inspectors 
ii. Training: rate/number of overdue training  
iii. Findings: rate/number of high priority findings 
b. Preventive Maintenance 
i. List: number of critical equipment not within the preventive 
maintenance list 
ii. Overdue: rate/number of overdue equipment  
iii. Qualification: rate/number of uncertified maintenance 
personnel 
c. Maintenance/Repair 
i. Repair quality: number of repaired equipment failed within 60 
days of major maintenance or repair 
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ii. Equipment quality: rate/number of urgent or unplanned repairs 
iii. Maintenance procedures: rate/number of maintenance 
procedures that was not clear or not followed 
iv. Qualification: rate/number of uncertified maintenance 
personnel 
 
 
Figure 12. Developing Process Safety Metrics for Mechanical Integrity 
 
The classification of mechanical integrity can be used to evaluate mechanical integrity 
effectiveness as shown in Figure 12. Also, this classification can be used to identify the 
exact deficiencies within the mechanical integrity program and possible ways for 
improvement (CCPS, 2007). 
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4.7.2 Standards/Procedures 
The operation procedures and standards have great effects on process safety 
performance. Base on OGP data analysis, deficiencies in procedures and standards were 
the second highest causal factor of process safety incidents after the mechanical 
integrity. Approximately 45% of high potential process safety events were caused by 
failure in procedures/standards organizational factor. Failure to follow the appropriate 
procedures during startup or shutdown of critical processes may result in serious process 
safety incidents. 
 
The main classification of procedures/standards organizational factor with recommended 
metrics are as follows:   
1) Operating Procedures (classification is shown in Figure 13) 
a. Written Procedures 
i. Availability: rate/number of operation procedures not 
available 
ii. Normal shutdown: rate/number of normal shutdown 
procedures not available 
iii. Emergency shutdown: rate/number of emergency 
shutdown procedures not available 
iv. Quality: rate/number of operation procedures not clearly 
defined 
v. Review: rate/number of procedures reviewed annually  
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vi. Overdue procedures: rate/number of operation procedures 
with overdue review dates 
vii. PHA: rate/number of procedures that lack hazard analysis 
 
Figure 13. Recommended Safety Metrics for Operation Procedures 
 
b. Implementation 
i. Normal operation: rate/number of operating procedures 
not followed during normal operation 
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ii. Startup: rate/number of operating procedures not followed 
during startup 
iii. Shutdown: rate/number of operating procedures not 
followed during normal shutdown 
iv. Emergency shutdown: rate/number of operating 
procedures not followed during emergency shutdown 
v. Process upset: number of processes upset due to not 
following procedures 
vi. Deviation: rate/number of deviations from the written 
procedures 
 
2) Standards 
a. Written 
i. Access: rate/number of difficult to access standards  
ii. Clarity: rate/number of standards that are not clear 
iii. Coverage: rate/number of processes not under the scope of 
current standards 
iv. Review: rate/number of standard reviews annually 
b. Implementations 
i. Clarity: rate/number of standards that are not easy to be 
implemented 
ii. Quality: rate/number of deficiencies found in standards 
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iii. Waivers: rate/number of waivers of standards 
iv. Deviations: rate/number of deviation from standard 
requirements 
 
4.7.3 Process Hazard Analysis/Risk Assessment 
The process hazard analysis (PHA) and risk assessment organizational factor 
significantly contribute to process safety performance. It is the main tool to identify and 
analyze the hazards within the industrial facility in a specific area or in general. Process 
hazard analysis and risk assessment organizational factor was the causal factor of 
approximately 43% of high potential process safety incidents. The detailed classification 
of process hazard analysis and risk assessment organizational factor with recommended 
metrics are shown in Figure 14 and are as follows:  
1) Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
a. Process Guidelines 
i. Policies: rate/number of unclear polices related to PHA 
ii. Overdue PHA: rate/number of PHAs overdue for new 
design and for revalidation 
iii. Training: rate/number of trained employees on PHA 
iv. Documentation: rate/number of PHA report that was 
unavailable or inaccessible 
v. Design: rate/number of PHA conducted after 50% detailed 
design stage  
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b. Meeting and Report 
i. Leader: rate/number of certified PHA leaders 
ii. Team members: rate/number of trained team members 
iii. PHA report: rate/number of major audit findings not 
identified during PHA 
iv. Quality: rate/number of recommendations per process unit  
c. Recommendations and Action Items 
i. Overdue: rate/number of overdue action items  
ii. Repeated: rate/number of repeated action items 
iii. Types: rate/number of administrative action items 
compared to control and design action items 
 
Figure 14. Recommended Safety Metrics for PHA 
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2) Risk Assessment 
a. Analysis 
i. Data: rate/number of mistakes in collected data used in 
risk analysis 
ii. Qualification: rate/number of risk assessments conducted 
by inexperienced or uncertified group 
b. Report 
i. Clarity: rate/number of unclear recommendations/findings 
in risk assessment reports 
ii. Quality: rate/number of reviews or audits that indicate a 
mistake within risk assessment reports 
The previous recommended metrics can be revised and modified to fit specific industrial 
facility needs (CCPS, 2007).  
 
4.7.4 Management of Change/Design 
Management of change (MOC) is a major element that has contributed to several process 
safety incidents. Changes in processes, procedures, equipment, and any other hardware 
or software changes within the industrial facility may result in new hazards not properly 
identified or analyzed. BP Texas City Refinery and Flixborough explosions are 
examples of two major process safety incidents that were caused by deficiencies in the 
management of change (MOC) organizational factor. Placing occupied trailers next to 
the isomerization unit that handled flammable materials indicated a failure of 
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management of change during BP Texas City Refinery explosion. Installation of 
undersized temporary bypass spool revealed major deficiencies in the management of 
change in the Flixborough explosion (Crowl & Louvar, 2011). 
 
Process safety enhancements of any industrial facility should be implemented in the 
design stage, where most of risks and hazards can be eliminated or controlled. Inherently 
safer designs and engineering controls can improve process safety systems (Crowl & 
Louvar, 2011). Multiple hazard analysis techniques shall be conducted during the 
different design stages to identify and analyze the associated hazards within the system 
and to achieve a safer design. 
 
The main classification of management of change (MOC) and design organizational 
factor with recommended metrics are as follows: 
1) Management of Change (MOC) 
a. Program 
i. Definition: unclear words or statements in MOC definitions  
ii. Scope: rate/number of general confusion generated by 
determination of whether specific changes fall under the scope 
of MOC 
iii. Polices: unavailability of clear and detailed polices/procedures  
iv. Documentation: rate/number of MOC report unavailable or 
inaccessible 
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b. Implementations 
i. Hazard analysis: rate/number of MOCs implemented without 
PHA 
ii. After the fact: rate/number of MOCs conducted after the 
change or at the final design stage 
iii. Quality: rate/number of MOCs completed immediately before 
start-up  
iv. Recommendations: rate/number of MOCs recommendation or 
action items not implemented or implemented after start-up 
v. Violation: rate/number of critical changes done without MOC 
 
2) Design 
a. Hazard Analysis (discussed in section 4.6.3) 
b. Mechanical Integrity (discussed in section 4.6.1) 
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5. DISCUSSIONS AND RESULTS 
In this section, a systematic procedure to develop process safety leading indicators will 
be discussed in detail. This discussion will include emphasis on the organizational 
factors’ importance, selection of appropriate metrics, process safety leadership, and 
revalidation of leading indicators measurements. Also, this section will include 
discussion about the importance of maintaining process safety performance at all times, 
especially during depressed periods. The current problems in process safety data systems 
will be clarified, and a comparison between normalized metrics and absolute metrics will 
be discussed. 
 
5.1 Develop Process Safety Leading Indicators 
Process safety leading indicators for each industrial facility shall be developed using a 
systematic technique to select, measure, and review process safety leading indicators as 
shown in Figure 15. Selection of appropriate and cost-effective leading indicators is the 
first step in the development process. Based on 2013 OGP data report analysis, 
organizational factors were the highest contributors to high potential process safety 
events, as shown in Table 4. Mechanical integrity, operational procedures, process 
hazard analysis, and management of change organizational factors were the most 
effective causal factors, respectively. Combinations of different organizational factors 
resulted in more effective coverage of process safety events, as shown in Figure 11. 
Selecting the most effective indicators is a very important step to prevent process safety 
incidents.  
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The second step in developing process safety leading indicators is identifying detailed 
metrics to measure efficiently the selected leading indicators. These process safety 
leading metrics shall be measurable, effective, well understood, meaningful, and lead to 
correct conclusions (CCPS, 2010). Several process safety leading metrics shall be used 
to measure the performance of each single leading indicator as shown in section 4.7. 
Many industrial facilities faced a lot of difficulties in selecting the effective and 
comprehensive metrics (Kenan & Kadri, 2014). 
 
Figure 15. Developing Process Safety Leading Indicators 
 
The third step is to conduct an accurate measurement of process safety leading metrics. 
There should be a well-organized process safety data collection system to gather the 
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required data to measure all process safety metrics. These measured metrics shall be 
analyzed to determine the performance of each selected process safety leading indicator 
(organizational factor). The measures of process safety leading indicators and related 
metrics would require continuous monitoring to ensure that all potential hazards and 
faults within the process safety system are identified and corrected before an accident 
occurs. The process safety leading measures shall be reported to high management on a 
frequent basis and shall be communicated to employees within the industrial facility. 
 
The fourth step in developing process safety leading indicators entails corrective actions. 
When process safety measures reveal a low performance of a specific leading indicator, 
an immediate action should be taken to fix the deficiencies and improve performance. 
Process safety leading metrics can be used to identify the faults within the affected 
leading indicator. A follow-up should be conducted to verify the completion of 
corrective actions and retain of process safety leading indicator.    
 
Revalidation of the process safety leading indicator measurements is the fifth step in the 
development process. The process safety lagging indicators and near-misses shall be 
investigated and analyzed to identify faults and deficiencies within the process safety 
system that lead to these events. The process safety leading indicators measures shall be 
checked against near-misses and lagging indicators. A variation between the two 
measures would indicate inaccurate measurement of process safety leading indicators. 
The selected leading indicators should be modified to cover the causal factors of near-
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misses and lagging indicators, or assigned metrics shall be revised to correctly measure 
the subject leading indicators. Also, there may be deficiencies in the process safety data 
collection system that should be identified and rectified.          
 
5.2 Process Safety Leadership 
Management commitment and support are essential to maintain and implement 
successful processes of measuring safety leading indicators. Management commitment 
shall include providing all required staff and resources to implement effectively all steps 
of process safety leading indicators program (Kenan & Kadri, 2014). This will also 
indicate the importance of process safety leading indicators for the entire industrial 
facility, where employees will be definitely affected by management. Frequent 
management engagement in the process safety leading program is very important to 
overcome all difficulties that face the implementation program (CCPS, 2010). 
 
Process safety management leadership is essential to develop, implement, and monitor a 
process safety leading indicators program. Because of the importance of process safety 
leadership, some industrial facilities began to place considerable efforts into developing 
process safety leadership programs. Dow chemical company has established a new 
leader review process to enhance the process safety leadership of new managers/leaders. 
As per this process, new leaders are required to conduct a thorough safety review within 
90 days of taking a leader position. The assigned leader cannot approve any critical job 
or management of change (MOC) that involves reactive materials until he completes the 
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assigned new leader process safety review. The review process should include all high 
potential process safety hazards and available reactive chemicals within the industrial 
facility (Efaw, 2012). 
 
The new Dow chemical leader review is required to include all reactive chemicals that 
exist within the industrial facility. Moreover, the new leader review is recommended to 
include all high-potential process safety hazards associated with industrial facility 
processes. Knowledgeable and experienced instructors shall train the new leaders about 
the hazards associated with the existing reactive chemicals. The new leader review 
process includes study of worst case scenarios, reviews of the fire and explosion index, a 
review of the HAZOP status, and conduct field verifications (Efaw, 2012). 
 
5.3 Maintaining Process Safety Performance during Depressed Times 
The process safety leading indicators would require continuous monitoring to ensure that 
all developed potential hazards and weaknesses in process safety systems are identified 
immediately to take corrective actions before an incident occurs. Any delay in 
identifying and eliminating these potential hazards may result in high potential process 
safety incidents. Thus it is essential to maintain high levels of process safety 
performance during all industrial facility activities, such as normal operations, start-ups, 
and major plant shutdowns. Continuous monitoring of process safety leading indicators 
measures would require effort and time. Most leading indicators can be measured and 
monitored using regular inspections, safety observations, and audits (HSE, 2006). 
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Some petrochemical industrial facilities may fail to maintain high levels of process 
safety performance, especially during depressed periods, as during these periods, focus 
is often on operational and maintenance activities employed in limited timeframes while 
ignoring process safety measures. Mechanical integrity and management of change 
processes may be overlooked during a major plant shutdown in which several activities 
and tasks shall be completed in short period. The Flixborough explosion revealed a 
failure in mechanical integrity and management of change when a decision was taken to 
install an available substandard bypass pipe to continue plant operation (Crowl & 
Louvar, 2011). The process safety measures were ignored during the depressed period, 
and correct actions were not taken to order the correct pipe or wait to fix the reactor. 
 
5.4 Independent Process Safety Data System 
Process safety indicators measures are collected and analyzed from several filed and 
process data within the industrial facility. Most of the safety data collection systems in 
the petrochemical industry were designed to handle the personnel safety indicators, such 
as injuries, fatalities, and first aid cases. These systems were not designed to handle 
process safety indicators (Kenan & Kadri, 2014). After the development of process 
indicators, these safety data collection systems were modified to include the process 
safety events. As a result, the process safety data were mixed with personnel safety data, 
an occurrence that could result in losing track of process safety events. It cannot be 
determined whether the fatalities resulted from personnel incidents (falls, electrocutions) 
or from process incidents (fires, explosions). Also, the listed fires cannot be identified as 
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a consequence of process safety incidents or not. Fires associated with process 
equipment and chemicals would be classified as process safety incidents, but trash fires 
(inside the building) and house fires (within the industrial facility camp) should not be 
classified as a process safety event.   
 
Developing effective process safety indicators would require constructing an 
independent process safety data collection system. This system should be automated and 
able to analyze the different metrics input and data to show variable measures of the 
selected leading and lagging indicators in a timely manner. This system should be linked 
to investigation analysis of process safety incidents and near-misses, where the most 
common root causes should be analyzed and monitored closely. 
 
5.5 Absolute and Normalized Process Safety Metrics   
The process safety leading indicators and metrics can be expressed mainly in two forms: 
absolute metrics and normalized metrics. Absolute metrics would represent the measures 
as a direct count of events such as number of conducted process hazard analysis, number 
of reviewed operation procedures, and number of conducted management of change. 
Normalized metrics would represent the measures as a rate or ratio such as rate of open 
HAZAP items, rate of trained employees, and rate of overdue preventive maintenance 
items (CCPS, 2010). 
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Normalized metrics are ratio expressions that are used frequently to make an effective 
comparison of process safety performance between different industrial organizations and 
companies. There are several denominators that can be used to calculate the normalized 
metrics, such as total work hours, chemical production capacity, and energy 
consumption. These metrics can be easily understood by non-technical parties such as 
management, stakeholders, and communities. Process safety lagging indicators are 
normally represented using consistent normalized metrics to measure the rate of process 
safety incidents (Wang, Mentzer et al., 2013).   
 
Absolute metrics are simple and direct representations of the number of reported events 
or activities. These metrics are not designed to be used in the comparison between 
different industrial organizations. Both absolute and normalized metrics do not provide 
information about the quality of process safety events or activities (CCPS, 2010). 
 
The main objective of process safety leading indicators is to improve process safety 
performance. Absolute metrics should be used in representing the critical process safety 
data because the normalized metrics can draw attention from vital information by 
focusing on the rate expression (CCPS, 2010). It is important to know the actual number 
of failures in the process safety system to work on and fix them. Another concern is that 
the numbers in absolute or normalized metrics would not provide details about criticality 
of the event or activity. Failure in the mechanical integrity of the main fuel line to 
hazardous equipment and failure in the mechanical integrity of water line should not 
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justify equal attention. However, both failures have the same value representation in the 
absolute and normalized metrics. Thus, it is recommended to include details about each 
recorded event or activity. Also, the weighting factor can be used to represent the 
criticality of the event or activity. 
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6. SUMMARY 
Process safety leading indicators are essential to monitor and improve process safety 
performance before a potential event occurs. The leading indicators are well-connected 
to near-misses and lagging indicators to form a system that able to measure the 
performance and identify the deficiencies within the process safety system.  Lagging 
indicators function more as reactive monitoring, while leading indicators function as 
proactive monitoring. Organizational factors have significant effects on the process 
safety systems in petrochemical industrial facilities. 
 
Process safety leading indicators should be developed using a systematic approach. Type 
and quantity of selected leading indicators are very important to have a cost-effective 
process in which a limited number of indicators provide effective insights of process 
safety systems. The petrochemical industrial organizations should focus on most 
effective leading indicators. The analysis of OGP data reveals that the most effective 
causal factors are mechanical integrity, operation procedures/standards, process hazard 
analysis, and design/management of change, respectively. Comprehensive safety metrics 
should be developed for each selected leading indicator. An accurate measurement 
should be conducted for these developed metrics, and immediate action should be taken 
to fix any deficiency with the process safety system. Lagging indicators and near-misses 
data should be used to check leading indicators measures.  
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7. FUTURE WORK 
The current available safety database is lacking of process safety leading indicators 
measures. Also, petrochemical industrial companies are still in the experimental stages 
of measuring the leading indicators. A significant amount of process safety leading 
indicators data are expected to be available for the public within the next few years, as 
the petrochemical industrial companies focus on measuring the process safety 
performance. Within the next few years, there should be several process safety surveys 
that can form a good source for a safety database.  
 
Future work will include revalidation of the developed systematic technique using direct 
process safety indicators data. There may be an actual implementation of developed 
process safety leading indicators process in a petrochemical industrial organization to 
check its effectiveness. The future work should also include an estimation of the ratio 
between the leading indicators, lagging indicators, and near-misses that form the process 
safety pyramid. The relation between safety culture and process safety leading indicators 
should be studied, and influences of each element shall be estimated in a quantitative 
approach. 
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